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1. Introduction
In efforts to combat climate change and to meet greenhouse gas emissions targets, there
has been a worldwide expansion of variable renewable electricity generation. For instance,
the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects that variable renewables will switch places
with coal in the global power mix by 2040 with the share of renewable generation predicted
to be around 40% (IEA, 2018). On the other hand, rising incomes, growing populations
in developing countries, and a change in consumer tastes towards the electrification of heat
and transport are expected to further push up global electricity demand. This growth in
demand together with the expansion of variable renewables will have significant implications
for the future electricity system. One main concern is how the system can maintain balance
between supply and demand with growing intermittent production from renewable sources
such as solar PV and wind power that result in volatility for the energy system’s residual
load. For this reason, there is an increasing demand for flexibility. At present, the power
system’s balance relies primarily upon traditional sources of flexibility on the supply side
i.e. from the conventional power plants and the electricity grid, though with the transition
underway to a more decarbonised system, new sources of flexibility are required and at a much
greater scale. Specifically, this flexibility will be achieved through mechanisms including new
interconnections, energy storage and demand response.
Demand response (DR) is a flexibility instrument increasingly employed by utilities and
grid operators to promote behavioural change in the energy use of consumers and is consid-
ered to be an effective way to balance systems with large shares of intermittent electricity
generation (Aghaei and Alizadeh, 2013; Lund et al., 2015; Sto¨tzer et al., 2015; Feuerriegel
and Neumann, 2016; Parrish et al., 2019). The main aim of DR is to encourage lower power
usage during periods when the electricity system is imbalanced between supply and demand
or when electricity market prices are unfavourable during peak load conditions. DR pro-
grammes allow consumers a greater role in reducing their energy consumption and shifting
their demand for energy during these peak periods by either improving the information
available on potential energy efficiency opportunities or by giving a financial incentive to
decrease their overall energy use. The evolution of ‘smart metering’ and ‘smart loads’ as fun-
damental blocks of the ‘smart grid’ have made residential DR more effective (Strbac, 2008;
Faruqui et al., 2010; Joskow, 2012; Goulden et al., 2014; Benetti et al., 2016) by increasing
the frequency and availability of opportunities for flexibility in energy demand.
One incentive-based DR instrument that benefits significantly from the support of the
‘smart grid’ is so-called curtailable/interruptible electricity contracts (Woo et al., 2014),
whereby utilities get access to a consumer’s load to either interrupt it entirely or to curtail
it to some degree during periods of system instability. Similarly, another form of curtailable
contract is end-use specific in that the load curtailed is directly related to the final energy
service provided, for example, a remotely operated power button on a washing machine.
These types of contracts are valuable to the grid in terms of reducing expensive generation
capacity from the flexibility they provide grid operators for peak load reduction, and to
consumers, in term of the financial incentives that they would receive to reduce their peak
consumption. While interruptible/curtailable load contracts are relatively commonplace in
the industry and commercial sectors, there is very little penetration of such contracts in the
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residential sector where a large potential for increased system flexibility exists.
In the European Union (EU) alone, residential energy demand represents a significant
share of overall energy consumption, accounting for a quarter of total energy consumption. As
a consequence, it is a key priority area for EU policymakers concerned with the engagement
of its citizens in a so-called ‘Energy Union’ that encourages consumers to take ownership
of the energy transition to a low carbon and climate friendly European economy (European
Commission, 2015). Since there is some evidence that residential consumers typically prefer
curtailment strategies over energy efficiency strategies (Lesic et al., 2018), and a diversity of
contract types is necessary for demand response to be appealing to a variety of consumers (He
et al., 2013), there could be more engagement with a market for end-use specific curtailable
contracts in the residential sector. In particular, for domestic ‘smart appliances’, which
have the potential to provide significant load flexibility opportunities (D’hulst et al., 2015;
Drysdale et al., 2015; Nistor et al., 2015; Li and Pye, 2018) and, consequently, could play an
important role in this type of demand response.
In order to provide a meaningful estimate of the demand side flexibility of ‘smart ap-
pliances’, it is important to understand the value/utility that different electricity services
provide to consumers using these appliances. This is because electricity is a derived demand,
whereby consumers are not interested in the electricity itself but in the service they derive
from it to run their household appliances. Within this context, this paper examines con-
sumer preferences for curtailable contracts on different household appliances to be activated
during the peak load hours of between 5pm and 8pm in the evening. Using a discrete choice
experiment on a representative sample of 972 electricity consumers, each respondent is faced
with a selection of hypothetical electricity contracts with varying attributes that include cur-
tailment on separate household appliances, namely: the washing machine; the tumble dryer;
the dishwasher; and, the electric oven. Respondents’ choices in the experiment reveal their
preferences for peak hour curtailable contracts through their estimated loss or gain in utility
from five important attributes of the contracts, which are: the appliance to be curtailed;
maximum frequency of curtailment; whether or not there is advance notice of a curtailment
event; whether or not there is an opt out available; and, the electricity discount received.
More specifically, to take into account the rates of household appliance ownership, the
analysis is split between two samples, those consumers that have all four appliances in their
households (Own, n = 427) and those consumers that don’t have all four appliances (Don’t
Own, n = 545). Then, to help understand the incentives consumers need to become more
flexible with their peak hour electricity demand in these types of contracts, compensations
in the form of willingness to accept (WTA) estimates are calculated across the different non-
monetary attributes of the contract for the full sample and both sub-samples. Furthermore,
using the sample of consumers that own all four appliances, a welfare analysis is conducted
to determine consumers’ compensating variation for 96 different hypothetical curtailable
contracts. This helps to isolate the welfare loss or gain to consumers from different end-use
specific curtailable contracts when compared to their baseline ‘status quo’ contract.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a review of related
work, Section 3 provides a description of the choice experiment, the experimental design and
the data collection, together with the details of the econometric analysis used for the analysis
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of the choice responses. Results are presented in Section 4, and a discussion and conclusion
follow in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Much of the literature examining demand flexibility opportunities in electricity contracts
is focused on the dynamic pricing of electricity - see Dutta and Mitra (2017) for a compre-
hensive overview. Dynamic pricing is time-based and works by charging different prices for
electricity at different times according to demand. The overall goal is to give consumers
the monetary incentive to reduce their peak load and in turn, reduce peak capacity in-
vestments for the grid operators. In contrast to dynamic pricing, interruptible/curtailable
contracts are incentive-based instruments where consumers receive a bill discount or credit
in exchange for agreeing to reduce load during peak conditions or system instability (Aalami
et al., 2010). Thus, curtailable contracts could be considered more flexible and dependable
when compared to dynamic pricing contracts because they can be used in both market-based
and reliability-based programmes. Curtailment is activated in market-based programmes by
high market prices that generally occur during peak load. Whereas, curtailment is triggered
in reliability-based programmes by system balancing emergencies (Ng’uni et al., 2006).
Somewhat related to interruptible/curtailable contracts, there is a very limited body of
literature exploring variable capacity tariffs (Hayn et al., 2018; Simshauser, 2016; Hayn et al.,
2015; Ruiz et al., 2014; Strauss, 1994; Woo, 1990). Rather than employing different price
levels for the consumption of electricity like for dynamic pricing, variable capacity tariffs
work by applying price differentiation to the electricity capacity limits. For example, Hayn
et al. (2015) develop a set of four service level indicators for tariffs with variable capacity
prices. These are: a guaranteed capacity limit; a defined duration of curtailment; a defined
frequency of curtailment; and, an advance warning time.
In terms of discrete choice experiments, there are a number of studies which employ this
methodology to elicit consumer preferences for different types of electricity contracts. Most
closely related to this analysis are the non-market valuation studies by Broberg and Persson
(2016), Broberg et al. (2017) and Richter and Pollitt (2018). In examining people’s prefer-
ences for load shifting in a hypothetical Direct Load Control (DLC) programme in Sweden,
Broberg and Persson (2016) show that people place substantial value on not being controlled.
Specifically, their results imply that people require much greater compensation to restrict
their domestic electricity compared to their domestic heating and, that such compensation
is unrealistic in a real-world policy setting. On the other hand, their results suggest that
people will accept a relatively small compensation to allow their load be controlled remotely
in extreme situations.
In a separate study, Broberg et al. (2017) elicit people’s preferences for a softer load
control that restricts load on a number of occasions during peak demand hours in the winter
season in Sweden. The form that the ’soft’ load control takes in their analysis is strongly
connected with the variable capacity tariffs described above, in that temporary restrictions
would be placed on the maximum possible load available to a household to provide their
energy services. Similar to Broberg and Persson (2016), they find that this type of demand
flexibility is expensive with the value to consumers of access to their electricity during peak
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hours being far above the marginal cost to provide electricity. Their results also point out
that the stricter the restrictions on capacity, then the higher the compensations required by
people, while an increase in the duration of control was also found to be associated with
a higher compensation necessary. Additionally, Broberg et al. (2017) find that there is no
statistical difference in people’s preference for a flexible choice of appliances in soft load
control versus a pre-determined choice of appliances.
Considering the key attributes that consumers might accept, Richter and Pollitt (2018)
employ a choice experiment to analyse consumer demand for smart electricity services in
Great Britain. Like the previous studies, they show that consumers in Britain also require
statistically significant compensation to accept remote monitoring and load control by an
external provider. Amongst their other notable findings, Richter and Pollitt (2018) suggest
that consumers are willing to pay for technical support, whilst the compensation needed to
share their usage and personal data is found to be quite substantial. In addition to the above
choice analyses, there are also many studies which elicit consumer preferences for different
electricity contracts based on related attributes. For example, power outages and reliability
of electricity supply (Abdullah and Mariel, 2010; Pepermans, 2011; Carlsson and Martinsson,
2008; Hensher et al., 2014; Abrate et al., 2016; Ozbafli and Jenkins, 2016), electricity tariffs
Goett et al. (2000); Buryk et al. (2015) and electricity mix (Amador et al., 2013; Huh et al.,
2015).
3. Methodology
3.1. Choice Experiment
A discrete choice experiment is a stated preference survey method generally used to elicit
consumer preferences and estimate monetary values for non-market goods. It usually works
by presenting individuals with different choice sets and asking them to select their preferred
alternative from each choice set by making trade-offs between all of the attributes that make
up each alternative. The method is employed in this study to implicitly reveal consumer
preferences for electricity contracts with curtailment on household appliances during peak
hours. More specifically, a monetary compensation is included in the form of an electricity
discount in each contract to be able to indirectly infer willingness to accept (WTA) estimates
based on how respondents trade off the other attributes against the different compensations
offered.
Attributes and levels were chosen for inclusion in this choice experiment following an
extensive design process. First, a literature review was conducted reviewing non-market
valuation studies exploring electricity contracts i.e. separate studies eliciting consumer pref-
erences for load control, demand side management, electricity tariffs and power outages. This
helped to identify a range of possible attributes and levels for the type of electricity contract
with curtailment to be examined in this experiment. Following on from this, three separate
focus group discussions were conducted between March and April 2018. Each focus group
consisted of six people with participants recruited from a range of socio-demographic back-
grounds based primarily on them being the bill payers for their current household electricity
contract. Based on these discussions together with the findings from the related literature,
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five attributes were chosen to be included in the choice experiment. These attributes as well
as their different levels are outlined in Table 1.
The first attribute in each hypothetical electricity contract is the type of household ap-
pliance to be curtailed in the contract. For this attribute, the levels chosen are based on
the largest energy using white goods used in an Irish household in order to best provide
the greatest energy demand reductions to the energy system through peak hour curtailment.
These are: the electric oven; the tumble dryer; the washing machine; and the dishwasher.
In cases where a respondent owned a combined washer/dryer appliance, they were asked to
consider them as separate appliances for the purposes of this choice experiment. The second
attribute is the maximum frequency of curtailment, which describes the maximum number
of times per month that a curtailment event could take place as part of the terms of the
contract. This attribute is presented with three levels. A curtailment event could take place
up to three times per month, up to 6 times per month or up to 9 times per month. In
this context, it is also important to note that the time of curtailment is fixed across all the
hypothetical contracts and is between 5pm and 8pm in the evening. The third attribute is
whether or not a consumer would receive advance notice before a curtailment event. The
advance notice is specified to be at least 12 hours notice and it is presented with two levels,
yes and no, to indicate whether it is or is not a feature of the contract.
During focus group discussions, it was revealed that participants were very concerned
about a curtailment event occurring at the most inconvenient time, when for example, “a
dinner party is planned” or “a shirt needs washed for an interview” and the requirement for
the electric oven or washing machine is then indispensable. For circumstances such as this
the fourth attribute is whether or not there is an opt out, where the contract would provide
consumers with an opt out from one curtailment event per month. This attribute is also
presented with two levels, yes and no. Finally, the fifth attribute is the monetary attribute
which is required to indirectly estimate the welfare impacts. This is described as a discount
on the respondent’s bimonthly electricity bill and is the compensation for each hypothetical
contract including curtailment.
To reflect a realistic discount, the attribute is defined by three levels between ¿10 and
¿30. In order to derive meaningful values for the discount, two different approaches were
used. In the first approach, based on the assumed duration and frequency of curtailment
in the study, the number of hours of curtailment in a bimonthly period was calculated (54-
162h). Then, assuming that curtailment is most relevant during peak load, thus at peak
price hours, the average Irish wholesale market price of the most expensive 54-162 hours
was determined. Using standard capacities for the household appliances to calculate power
and energy demand as well as to derive the market values of the curtailed load, the load
values were found to range between ¿10 and ¿22. Note that these values only include
energy market prices, while investment related costs and any compensation/premium for
causing inconvenience to consumers are not considered. In a second approach, the full costs
of the new peak load capacity are calculated using an open-cycle gas turbine as an example.
Assuming 500¿/kW as specific investment, an interest rate of 10% and an economic lifetime
of 20 years, this approach leads to a discount of around ¿30 per bimonthly billing period.
As a result, a discount in the range of ¿10-¿30 bimonthly was deemed as most appropriate
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for the choice experiment.
3.2. Experimental Design
Respondent’s time constraints and average cognitive abilities restrict the number of
choices that they can credibly make on a single choice occasion, thus, a Bayesian efficient
experimental design was employed to generate a careful selection of choice cards for the ex-
periment. Unlike orthogonal designs, efficient designs aim to produce data that can generate
coefficient estimates that are statistically efficient with standard errors that are as small as
possible (Rose and Bliemer, 2009). If some prior information is available that allow prior
coefficient values to be specified, then a design can always be improved since the asymptotic
variance covariance (AVC) matrix can be determined and hence, standard errors can be
predicted. Indeed, it could be argued that an orthogonal design is only most efficient when
there is no prior information available. Further to this, to consider the potential uncertainty
about these prior coefficients, Bayesian efficient designs make use of random priors instead of
fixed priors and this means that the design can be made more robust to any misspecification
of the priors as a direct result.
In this study, a Bayesian efficient experimental design that follows Bliemer et al. (2008)
and minimizes the Bayesian D-error (Db-error) criterion was used. Moreover, a sequential
experimental design was adopted in which prior coefficients are updated as more information
about these priors becomes available. Initially, prior coefficients for the pilot study were
obtained from the pre-pilot, focus group discussions and the previous literature (Bliemer
and Collins, 2016). Whereas priors for the main field survey were based on Conditional
Logit (CL) estimates of the coefficients from the pilot study (n = 100). Results from Scarpa
et al. (2007) suggest that this type of design can deliver significant efficiency gains. In total,
24 choice cards are generated using this design approach with Ngene software. A sample
choice card is presented in Figure 1. Each card consisted of a choice of three hypothetical
electricity contracts, two contracts characterised by the different attributes that are discussed
previously and a third contract indicating a respondent’s ‘status quo’ contract (their current
contract as it is today). In each case, respondents were asked to choose their preferred
contract. In order to further reduce the burden for each respondent, the 24 choice cards were
divided into three blocks, so that each respondent had only to complete a randomly selected
block of eight choice cards. Furthermore, to help with any complexity in understanding what
the different hypothetical contracts have to offer consumers, respondents were provided with
a short animated tutorial video describing in plain language the different attributes of the
alternative contracts. The video also explained how to complete the choice experiment1.
1The Tutorial Video is available in Appendix A
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Table 1: Discrete choice experiment attributes and levels
Attributes Levels Description
Appliance to be curtailed Electric Oven, Tumble Dryer, The type of household appliance to be curtailed in the contract
Dishwasher, Washing Machine
Max frequency of curtailment 3/month, 6/month, 9/month The maximum number of times per month a curtailment event
could take place
Advance Notice Yes, No Whether or not you would receive advance notice of at least
12 hours before a curtailment event
Opt Out Yes, No Whether or not you have an opt out from one curtailment event
per month
Electricity Discount ¿10, ¿20, ¿30 Compensation for each contract including curtailment in the
form of a discount on the bimonthly electricity bill.
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Figure 1: Sample Choice Card
3.3. Data Collection
In general, the choice experiment survey comprised of four parts. The first part contained
questions about the respondent, their electricity bill and household appliance use. The
second part was the actual choice experiment where respondents first watched the animated
tutorial video describing the hypothetical curtailment contracts and then afterwards were
faced with eight different choice tasks. The third part involved a number of post choice
debriefing questions, and the final part collected some further information on the respondent’s
background and attitudes. Pre-pilot and pilot studies were first conducted with electricity
bill payers to establish the suitability of the attributes and levels as well as to test the
questions, tutorial video and the overall layout of the survey. The pilot study involved 100
respondents and the results found that there were generally no difficulties for participants
in understanding the questions or completing the eight choice cards presented to them.
Moreover, CL models estimated using the choice responses from the pilot revealed that
all coefficients conformed to a priori expectations and were statistically significant to the
respondent’s choice of electricity contract and, thus, no substantial changes to the design
were made for the main survey.
A stratified random sample was selected for the main survey using a sampling frame
from the 2016 Irish Census of Population aged 18 and over. The sample was stratified
by geographic location (NUTS III region), gender, age and employment status. The main
survey was conducted online using a representative panel (n=1,519) drawn from the panel
book of Research Now, an international company with over 80,000 panelists across Ireland.
The survey was conducted in July 2018. After a preliminary analysis, 539 respondent’s
observations were dropped due to their failure to correctly answer the two screening questions
in the survey instrument. The screening questions were included to ensure data quality by
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determining whether respondents were paying adequate attention2. Also, in line with best
practice, a further 108 respondent’s observations were removed since they were contained in
the top or bottom 5% of survey completion times. After their removal, the average completion
time for the survey is just over 15 mins. The final sample comprised of n=972 respondents
including the 100 respondent’s responses from the pilot and this sample is representative of
the population of Irish people aged 18 and over in terms of many demographic variables (see
the descriptive statistics in Table 2).
One important explanation for any preference heterogeneity for the appliance attribute is
household ownership of the individual appliances. In fact, it is argued that ownership of the
appliance in the household will influence the respondents choice of contract in the experiment.
While the ownership rates for the washing machine and the electric oven are very high in the
sample at 99% and 90% respectively, the ownership rates for the tumble dryer and dishwasher
are lower at 66% and 65% respectively3 (see Table 2). For this reason, the analysis is split
between two samples, those respondents that have all four appliances in their households
(Own, n = 427) and those respondents that don’t have all four appliances (Don’t Own,
n = 545). The reasoning for this follows a key assumption in discrete choice experiments that
respondents are able to make relative tradeoffs between the different attributes in the choice
cards presented. This assumption can be considered much more realistic for the respondents
that own all of the appliances and hence, are able to make relative tradeoffs in all choice
scenarios. In addition, the results from the analysis on the sample of respondents that don’t
have all four appliances in their households could provide an insight into the attributes
that influence their choices across curtailment contracts. The descriptive statistics for both
sub-samples are also reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and the representativeness of the sample
Sub-sample Sub-sample
owning not owning Total National
all appliances all appliances Sample Statistics†
Variables % % % %
Gender
Female 49.18 57.98 54.12 51.12
Male 50.82 42.02 45.88 48.88
Age
18-24 years 10.30 9.54 9.88 10.99
25-34 years 15.22 17.80 16.67 18.47
35-44 years 19.67 22.75 21.40 20.91
45-54 years 17.33 17.98 17.70 17.53
55-64 years 16.86 15.23 15.95 14.25
65+ years 20.61 16.70 18.42 17.85
Continued on next page
2The screening questions used in the study are presented in Appendix A
3It is noteworthy that these sample ownership rates are representative of the population of electricity
consumers according to the Irish Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2015-2016
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Sub-sample Sub-sample
owning not owning Total National
all appliances all appliances Sample Statistics†
Variables % % % %
NUTS3 Region
Border 8.67 6.79 7.61 8.14
West 8.90 12.11 10.70 9.55
Mid-west 11.94 7.89 9.67 9.93
South-east 8.67 7.89 8.23 8.76
South-west 14.99 16.33 15.74 14.62
Dublin 23.89 30.09 27.37 29.18
Mid-east 16.16 13.94 14.92 13.88
Midlands 6.79 4.95 5.76 5.94
Primary Economic Status‡
Persons at work 55.27 60.37 58.13 53.43
Unemployed 5.62 5.69 5.66 7.92
Homemaker/Carer 9.60 6.61 7.92 8.14
Student 6.56 6.97 6.79 11.37
Retired 20.84 16.33 18.31 14.52
Unable to work 2.11 3.85 3.09 4.22
Other 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.40
Appliance Ownership
Electric Oven 100.00 81.28 89.51 -
Dishwasher 100.00 37.25 64.81 64.70
Washing Machine 100.00 97.98 98.87 97.50
Tumble Dryer 100.00 39.82 66.26 64.80
Location
Urban 59.48 67.16 63.79 60.09
Rural 40.52 32.84 36.21 39.91
Tenure
Rented 16.86 42.57 31.28 27.67
Owned by mortgage 39.82 24.41 31.17 31.55
Owned outright 42.62 31.93 36.63 36.04
Other 0.70 1.10 0.93 1.62
Not stated - - - 3.12
Dwelling Type
Apartment 7.03 20.48 14.55 12.03
Terraced 10.77 15.50 13.42 16.76
Semi-detached 30.68 30.63 30.65 27.80
Detached & bungalow 51.05 32.65 40.77 42.12
Other 0.47 0.74 0.62 1.29
No. of Household Members
One or two members 43.32 57.07 51.03 52.07
Three members 20.84 18.17 19.34 17.48
Four members 21.78 15.05 18.00 16.94
Five+ members 14.05 9.72 11.63 13.51
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Sub-sample Sub-sample
owning not owning Total National
all appliances all appliances Sample Statistics†
Variables % % % %
Market Share§
Bord Gais 20.37 20.92 20.68 17.80
Electric Ireland 46.60 47.52 47.12 49.53
Energia 10.30 7.34 8.64 7.96
Panda Power 0.94 1.65 1.34 1.51
Pinergy 0.23 0.18 0.21 1.46
Prepay Power 5.85 5.14 5.45 5.99
SSE Airtricity 12.88 14.13 13.58 15.36
Don’t Know 2.11 1.47 1.75 0.00
Other 0.72 1.65 1.23 0.39
† National statistics are taken from Ireland’s Census of Population 2016 and from
the Irish Household Budget Survey 2015-2016 where appropriate.
‡ National statistics for Primary Economic Status also include persons aged 15-17
years, while the sample in this study consists only of persons aged 18 and over.
§ National market shares are taken from Ireland’s Commission for Regulation of
Utilities 2017 Electricity and Gas Retail Markets Annual Report.
3.4. Econometric Analysis
The analysis of the responses to the choice experiment is based in random utility theory
(McFadden, 1974), where individuals choose the electricity contract that provides them with
the highest utility level. The theory states that the indirect utility Uni for individual n from
choosing contract i is assumed to be a linear function of the contract attributes Xni and a
random component ni, such that:
Uni = β
′Xni + ni (1)
where β represents a vector of coefficient estimates corresponding to the contract attributes
Xni as well as to the alternative specific constant (ASC). To be consistent with demand
theory (Louviere et al., 2000), one of the contracts in the choice experiment represents a
status quo contract, a respondent’s current contract as it is today. It is important to present
this baseline contract so that respondents can understand and identify the consequences for
their utility from the contract changes to be valued in the experiment by allowing them
to express a preference for or against their current service contract (Johnston et al., 2017).
These preferences are then captured in the models by the coefficient for the ASC.
In the standard conditional logit (CL) model, ni is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed extreme value type 1, so the probability Pni that an individual n will
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choose contract i in the set of J alternatives is expressed by:
Pni =
exp(β′Xni)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′Xnj)
(2)
While the CL model is most generally used for the analysis of responses in a discrete choice
experiment, it makes a number of very restrictive assumptions. First, it assumes that choices
are independent from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Second, it assumes that preferences are
homogeneous across individuals and, finally, it makes the assumption that any unobserved
heterogeneity is uncorrelated over the repeated panel of choices. Given these limitations,
the random parameters logit (RPL) model is a more appropriate estimator for this analysis
because it takes into account the panel nature of the data and considers unobserved hetero-
geneity explicitly in modelling the responses. More specifically, it assumes that the coefficient
vector βn varies across individuals in the population with density f(βn|θ), where θ represents
a vector of the true parameters of the taste distribution. For a sample with N individuals,
each individual n has a choice of J alternative contracts on T choice occasions, such that the
utility Unjt that individual n derives from choosing contract j on choice occasion t is:
Unjt = β
′
nXnjt + njt (3)
Here, if βn is observable and the random component ni is independent and identically
distributed extreme value type 1, the conditional choice probability of contract i for individual
n on choice occasion t is given by:
Pnit|βn = exp(β
′
nXnit)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′
nXnjt)
(4)
Since βn is unobserved, the unconditional choice probability is defined as the integral of
Pnit|βn for all possible values of βn:
Pnit =
∫ ( exp(β′nXnit)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′
nXnjt)
)
f(βn|θ)dβn (5)
For the purposes of this analysis, a simulated maximum likelihood estimator based on
1,000 Halton draws is used to estimate the models due to the fact that the integral cannot
be evaluated analytically. In addition to this, taste parameters are assumed to be correlated
and so, RPL models with correlated coefficients (RPL-C) are also estimated to consider the
likelihood that the random coefficients are related across the curtailment contract attributes.
To this end, the starting values for the RPL-C model are taken from the standard estimated
RPL model with uncorrelated coefficients and then, a simulated maximum likelihood esti-
mator based on 2,000 Halton draws is used to estimate the final RPL-C models.
Also of importance to the employment of both the RPL and RPL-C models, is the choice
of coefficients that should be allowed to be random and vary across individuals as well as
the choice of the distribution that these coefficients should then follow (Hole, 2008). All
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coefficients in this study with the exception of the coefficient on the monetary attribute
(electricity discount) are specified as random and the distribution of the taste variation is
modelled with a normal distribution like in previous related studies (Carlsson and Martinsson
(2008); Pepermans (2011); Buryk et al. (2015) and Broberg and Persson (2016)). On the
other hand, the electricity discount coefficient is specified to be fixed (non-random) to avoid
heavily skewed Willingness to Accept (WTA) distributions as described in Hole and Kolstad
(2012).
The electricity discount attribute is included in order to derive a marginal value for the
different contract attributes in the form of the Marginal Willingness to Accept (MWTA) for
each of the separate attributes. For the estimation of this MWTA, a distinction is made
between the monetary discount attribute, mnjt, and the non-monetary attributes, x
k
njt in
Equation 3, such that:
Unjt = λmnjt +
k∑
k=1
βknx
k
njt + njt (6)
where λ is the marginal utility of income represented by the coefficient for the monetary
discount attribute and βkn are the coefficients for the non-monetary attributes as well as the
coefficient for the ASC. Thus, to estimate the MWTA for an attribute k, the ratio of its
coefficient βkn to that of the coefficient on the monetary attribute λ is calculated as follows:
MWTA = −β
k
n
λ
(7)
Overall, CL, RPL and RPL-C models are estimated for the full sample of respondents
and RPL-C models are estimated for two separate sub-samples of respondents where the sub-
samples were chosen for the reasons outlined in Section 3.3. The first sub-sample is made up
of those respondents who have all four appliances in their households (Own, n = 427) and
the second sample consists of those respondents that don’t have all four appliances (Don’t
Own, n = 545). Then, the MWTA estimates are based on the coefficients from the RPL-C
models for each of the samples.
Finally, to measure the economic welfare impact of different curtailment contracts on the
consumers of electricity, the compensating variation (CV) which measures the consumers’
minimum WTA for some level of appliance curtailment is also estimated for the sample of
respondents that own all four appliances using the coefficients from the random parameters
logit model with correlated coefficients. The CV is the monetary amount that needs to
be added to the consumer’s income to make him or her as well off as at his or her initial
utility level. The welfare loss or gain experienced by the average consumer as a result of the
difference between their new curtailment contract and their status quo contract is expressed
as:
CV = − (V
0 − V 1)
λ
(8)
where V 0 is representative of the average individual’s utility with the status quo contract
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and V 1 represents the average individual’s utility with the new curtailment contract. In this
study, the welfare impacts on an average individual is calculated under 96 different contract
scenarios which are outlined in Section 4.4.
4. Results
4.1. Full Sample Econometric Results
The results for the full sample of respondents are presented in Table 3 from three separate
models; the conditional logit (CL) model (1), the random parameters logit (RPL) model
(2), and the random parameters logit model with correlated coefficients (RPL-C) (3). All
attribute levels are dummy coded with the exception of both the electricity discount and the
frequency of curtailment which are treated as continuous variables in the analysis.
In general across the three models, the parameters for all attributes conform to a priori
expectations with the expected signs estimated for most of the attributes. Nevertheless, the
parameters in the CL model are of lesser magnitudes than those in the other two models
except for the parameter on the Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) which is of a larger
positive magnitude and is also statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This
suggests that, ceteris paribus, electricity consumers prefer to choose the status quo contract
rather than any contract with curtailment. It is important to note, however, that the CL
model assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, whereby the rela-
tive probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the availability of other
alternatives. Estimated results from a CL model are biased if the IIA assumption is violated.
The Hausman and McFadden (1984) test for IIA was performed on the CL model here and
the IIA assumption is rejected at the 99% confidence level. Thus, the results from the CL
model are biased and the alternative models are necessary.
Indeed, to overcome the limitation of the CL model and to also take into consideration
consumers’ preference heterogeneity, the results for both the RPL and the RPL-C are pre-
sented. In comparing the log-likelihood, the Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian
information criterion across the three models it is also evident that both the RPL and the
RPL-C are a much better fit statistically compared to the CL model, though it is not partic-
ularly clear which model between the RPL and the RPL-C performs best in terms of fit to
the data. The log-likelihood improves slightly in the RPL-C model moving from −5, 853 to
−5, 774 together with an improvement in the AIC which decreases from 11, 735 to 11, 619.
On the other hand, the BIC which places more weight on the number of parameters in a
model increases in the RPL-C model where the elements of the lower triangular Cholesky
matrix are additional parameters for the model. Despite this, the RPL-C is chosen as the
preferred estimator because it fits a model where coefficients are assumed to be correlated.
Theoretically it could be argued that for electricity contracts with curtailment, consumers
who like a particular attribute of a contract might also tend to like or dislike some other
attributes in the contract, thus, for the purposes of the interpretation of the results the
estimated parameters from the RPL-C in model (3) are used hereafter.
In contrast to the CL model, the mean estimate for the coefficient on the ASC is sta-
tistically insignificant in the RPL-C model. This indicates that, all other factors equal,
respondents are indifferent to the status quo electricity contract (their current contract as
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Table 3: Parameter estimates for the full sample from three separate estimators
(1) (2) (3)
(CL) (RPL) (RPL-C)
Conditional Random RPL
Logit Parameters Logit (Correlated Coefficients)
Attributes Coefficient Coefficient Std Dev Coefficient Std Dev
Electricity Discount 0.048*** 0.092*** 0.095***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Electric Oven1 -0.774*** -1.857*** 2.150*** -1.798*** 2.168***
(0.061) (0.142) (0.141) (0.157) (0.163)
Tumble Dryer1 0.210*** 0.144 1.806*** 0.121 2.192***
(0.053) (0.096) (0.141) (0.113) (0.157)
Dishwasher1 0.077 -0.065 1.311*** -0.158 1.683***
(0.050) (0.087) (0.131) (0.107) (0.150)
Frequency -0.037*** -0.099*** 0.179*** -0.109*** 0.189***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
Advance Notice 0.207*** 0.359*** -0.664*** 0.428*** 0.729***
(0.029) (0.049) (0.088) (0.058) (0.093)
Opt Out 0.145*** 0.271*** -0.141 0.349*** 0.345***
(0.026) (0.043) (0.112) (0.052) (0.084)
ASC 0.784*** 0.357* 4.302*** 0.296 4.371***
(0.077) (0.193) (0.244) (0.193) (0.244)
No. of respondents 972 972 972
No. of observations 23328 23328 23328
Log-likelihood -8080.779 -5852.679 -5773.514
AIC 16177.558 11735.358 11619.028
BIC 16242.017 11856.219 11909.094
χ2 Statistic 628.907 407.411 372.602
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis
1Reference category is the washing machine
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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it is today) on average. Though, turning to the estimated standard deviation for the coef-
ficient on ASC, it is evident that there is large preference heterogeneity around the status
quo contract given the large and highly statistically significant standard deviation estimate
relative to the mean. As expected, this result suggests that the coefficient on ASC varies to
a large degree across the respondents.
Concerning the attribute for electricity discount, the marginal utility of income is assumed
to be constant across individuals and so the estimated parameter for the electricity discount
is specified as non-random in the RPL-C model. The results show a positive and highly
statistically significant coefficient for the discount attribute. Ceteris paribus, respondents
are shown to prefer higher discounts. This is in agreement with economic theory and also
lends further support to the theoretical validity of the experiment itself.
In terms of the attributes; frequency, advance notice, and opt out, the signs of the co-
efficients also conform to prior beliefs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Not
surprisingly, the mean parameter on frequency is estimated to be negative, suggesting that
respondents prefer electricity contracts with less frequent curtailment events on average.
Whereas, the mean coefficients on both advance notice and opt out are found to be positive.
This indicates that on average consumers have a preference for such contracts to include
advance notice of at least 12 hours before an upcoming curtailment event together with an
opt out from one event per month which can be used in a case of exceptional circumstance
or otherwise. It is of particular note that the estimated standard deviations for the coeffi-
cients of these attributes are also highly statistically significant, indicating that preference
heterogeneity is present and that the coefficients differ across respondents but not to the
same extent compared to the ASC.
Most interestingly, the results for the attribute describing the household appliance to be
curtailed in these types of electricity contracts show that a contract curtailing the electric
oven at the peak evening times between 5 and 8pm is significantly less favoured compared to
a contract curtailing the washing machine. This is evident from the large negative magnitude
(absolute value) of the coefficient for the electric oven. Given that the electric oven is one
such household appliance with the greatest use value for cooking during the evening peak,
this result is as expected. In contrast, the coefficients on the tumble dryer and the dishwasher
are of a much lesser magnitude and are found to be statistically insignificant to respondents’
utility. Nevertheless, the estimated standard deviations for these appliance attributes are
statistically significant, demonstrating the large taste heterogeneity across respondents for
the inclusion of these different types of appliance in electricity curtailment contracts.
4.2. Sub-sample Econometric Results
To take into account the rates of household appliance ownership and to help satisfy a key
assumption in discrete choice experiments that respondents are able to make relative tradeoffs
between the different attributes in the choice cards presented to them, the analysis is split
between two samples, those respondents who have all four appliances in their households
(Own, n = 427) and those respondents that don’t have all four appliances (Don’t Own,
n = 545). The estimated results from the RPL-C model for both sub-samples together with
the results from the full sample for comparison are reported in Table 4. Reassuringly, in
comparing across the three samples, the mean parameter estimates for frequency, advance
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notice, opt out and the ASC are very similar in terms of absolute values and statistical
significance. Again, the mean coefficient for the ASC is insignificant across the different
samples, indicating that respondents tend to be indifferent toward the status quo contract.
Though the standard deviation on ASC is still significant with the largest absolute value for
the sample of respondents that own all appliances. For the fixed parameter on electricity
discount the estimate is also the same across the samples and provides additional confidence
in the validity of the experiment.
Similarly, the mean estimate for the coefficient on the electric oven is consistent across
samples with the electric oven being found to be much less preferred on average relative
to the washing machine in this type of curtailment contract. On the contrary, there are
large differences for the mean coefficients on the tumble dryer and the dishwasher across
the separate samples. While the estimated mean parameters for both these attributes are
insignificant for the full sample, they are significant for the sample of respondents that own all
four appliances and the sample of consumers that don’t. Furthermore, the mean estimates
differ in their signs for both these sub-samples. In the sample of respondents that have
all household appliances the coefficients are positive, which suggests that compared to the
washing machine, respondents prefer contracts that curtail either the tumble dryer or the
dishwasher. Whilst for the sample that don’t have all appliances the opposite is found, where
respondents are less likely to prefer contracts that curtail the tumble dryer or dishwasher
rather than the washing machine.
Intuitively, this is expected with the sample of consumers that own all household appli-
ances being the one that best matches the assumptions underlying the experimental method-
ology of discrete choice. In other words, this sample of respondents are best placed to make all
the relative tradeoffs amongst the different attributes in an electricity contract with curtail-
ment and so, the most confidence can be given to the parameter estimates here. Additionally,
the specified RPL-C model for this sample is also the one with the best statistical fit, where
the AIC and the BIC are lowest compared to the other samples. In this context, the results
from model (2) in Table 4 show that for the different levels of household appliance, the most
preferred appliance to be curtailed at the peak evening times is the tumble dryer, followed
somewhat closely by the dishwasher when compared to the washing machine. While in con-
trast, respondents are revealed to have a very strong negative utility toward the electric oven
being included in this type of curtailment contract.
Also of relevance are the results for the sub-sample of respondents that don’t have all
four appliances in their households. The negative and significant coefficients on the tumble
dryer and dishwasher levels of the appliance to be curtailed could plausibly be explained
by the fact that the respondents to the experiment are less likely to have either of these
appliances in their households and therefore also much less likely to choose a contract which
would curtail these appliance types rather than the washing machine on average. As a
consequence, the respondents could be considered to have acted rationally in the experiment
and again provides some further assurance for the theoretical validity of the methodology.
In addition, it is of particular note that the estimated standard deviations for the co-
efficients on the tumble dryer and dishwasher are a much larger magnitude compared to
the mean estimates for the sub-sample of respondents that don’t own all appliances (model
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Table 4: Parameter estimates from the Random Parameters Logit (Correlated Coefficients) Model
(1) (2) (3)
Attributes Full Sample Own Don’t Own
Non-random parameter
Electricity Discount 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.094***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Random parameters: Mean
Electric Oven1 -1.798*** -1.787*** -1.817***
(0.157) (0.224) (0.185)
Tumble Dryer1 0.121 0.842*** -0.483***
(0.113) (0.153) (0.177)
Dishwasher1 -0.158 0.408*** -0.519***
(0.107) (0.134) (0.146)
Frequency -0.109*** -0.101*** -0.115***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.018)
Advance Notice 0.428*** 0.368*** 0.423***
(0.058) (0.090) (0.079)
Opt Out 0.349*** 0.353*** 0.311***
(0.052) (0.079) (0.068)
ASC 0.296 0.438 0.218
(0.193) (0.375) (0.313)
St Dev of random parameters
Electric Oven 2.168*** 2.064*** 2.312***
(0.163) (0.233) (0.223)
Tumble Dryer 2.192*** 1.559*** 2.585***
(0.157) (0.206) (0.232)
Dishwasher 1.683*** 1.003*** 2.029***
(0.150) (0.213) (0.193)
Frequency 0.189*** 0.181*** 0.201***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.028)
Advance Notice 0.729*** 0.957*** 0.529***
(0.093) (0.122) (0.139)
Opt Out 0.345*** 0.367*** 0.350***
(0.084) (0.123) (0.123)
ASC 4.371*** 5.009*** 3.866***
(0.244) (0.389) (0.309)
No. of respondents 972 427 545
No. of observations 23328 10248 13080
Log-likelihood -5773.514 -2460.311 -3252.858
AIC 11619.028 4992.622 6577.715
BIC 11909.094 5253.076 6846.954
χ2 Statistic 372.602 178.565 229.337
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
1Reference category is the washing machine
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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(3)) and relative to the sample for model (2). This suggests that there is larger preference
heterogeneity for these attributes for the model (3) sample and that some respondents would
still have chosen contracts with appliance types that they did not have in their households.
Also interestingly, the standard deviation estimate on the ASC is largest in absolute value
for the sample in model (2), which would indicate a greater difference in tastes for the status
quo contract amongst that sample. Despite this, on average the sample remains statistically
indifferent to their current contracts as they exist today.
4.3. Marginal Willingness To Accept
To estimate a value for the trade-offs that respondents make between the different at-
tributes in the experiment, the non-monetary coefficients are normalised with the fixed pa-
rameter on the monetary attribute. The monetary attribute here is the compensation re-
ceived for each contract that includes curtailment. This compensation is provided in the
form of a discount on the respondents bi-monthly electricity bill. These values reflect the
mean marginal willingness to accept (WTA) for each attribute level and are estimated across
the separate samples described before for the RPL-C models. The WTA values are directly
relatable to the electricity discount levels indicated in the experiment and are stand alone
estimates. In other words, they cannot be summed. Table 5 presents the WTA estimates
together with their 95% confidence intervals for each sample using the estimated coefficients
from the RPL-C models in Table 4. The confidence intervals are calculated using the Delta
method.
As expected, most disutility is placed on having the electric oven curtailed at the peak
evening hours between 5pm and 8pm with respondents requiring compensation of somewhere
between ¿14.32 and ¿23.16 on their bi-monthly bill when compared to a contract that
curtails their washing machine. The compensation range here is dependent on the separate
samples. Again, it is important to highlight that the sample with the most reliable mean
estimates for the tumble dryer and dishwasher attribute levels is for the sample of respondents
that have all four appliance in their homes. Within this context, the mean marginal WTA
estimates are found to be negative and therefore show that respondents are, on average,
willing to pay ¿8.64 bimonthly to curtail the tumble dryer and ¿4.19 bimonthly to curtail the
dishwasher, both relative to the washing machine. The willingness to pay (WTP) estimates
are reflected in the negative WTA for these attributes and might be better described as the
average amount less that respondents would need to be compensated compared to curtailing
their washing machines. Moreover, the positive WTA estimates for the sample in model (3)
need to be interpreted very carefully. It is necessary to bear in mind for these results that
the estimates are most probably an implication of the fact that respondents were much less
likely to choose contracts that curtailed either the tumble dryer and dishwasher because they
did not own that particular appliance type rather than not choosing such contracts for any
other reason.
In terms of the frequency of curtailment, the WTA results imply that respondents would
require a discount of between 68 cents and ¿1.56 on their bimonthly electricity bill for each
additional curtailment event per month. In scaling these estimates to the monthly rate,
the results show that for each curtailment event, respondents would require, ceteris paribus,
a compensation of between 34 cents and 78 cents per event. For advance notice, the WTA
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results are negative and quite similar across the samples with a negative coefficient indicating
a willingness to pay (WTP) for the particular attribute. Thus, all else equal, respondents
would expect to pay between ¿2.02 and ¿6.17 bi-monthly, dependent on the sample, to
have advance notice for an upcoming curtailment event of at least 12 hours. Similarly, with
regards to opt out, the results suggest that respondents have a negative bi-monthly WTA of
between ¿1.85 and ¿5.25 to allow them an opt out from one curtailment event per month.
Finally, the WTA estimates on the ASC are also found to be negative which could suggest
that respondents would be willing to pay to remain with their status quo contracts, however,
these estimates are not statistically significant. While the WTA estimates presented in
Table 5 provide a useful measure of the value consumers place on the separate attributes of
an electricity contract with curtailment, it does not provide estimates of the compensating
variation for the contract alternatives. Thus, the results from a welfare analysis examining
the CV across different contract alternatives are reported in the next section.
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Table 5: Willingness to accept (WTA) (bimonthly) estimates for attributes of an electricity contract with curtailment from RPL (Correlated Coefficients) model
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Own Don’t Own
Attributes WTA(¿) [WTA(¿) 95% CI] WTA(¿) [WTA(¿) 95% CI] WTA(¿) [WTA(¿) 95% CI]
Electric Oven 18.92*** [15.82, 22.03] 18.33*** [14.32, 22.35] 19.26*** [15.35, 23.16]
Tumble Dryer -1.28 [-3.61, 1.06] -8.64*** [-11.95, -5.32] 5.12*** [1.49, 8.76]
Dishwasher 1.67 [-0.52, 3.86] -4.19*** [-7.04, -1.34] 5.50*** [2.55, 8.46]
Frequency 1.14*** [0.90, 1.39] 1.03*** [0.68, 1.39] 1.22*** [0.88, 1.56]
Advance Notice -4.50*** [-5.70, -3.31] -3.77*** [-5.52, -2.02] -4.49*** [-6.17, -2.80]
Opt Out -3.68*** [-4.80, -2.56] -3.62*** [-5.25, -2.00] -3.30*** [-4.75, -1.85]
ASC -3.11 [-7.03, 0.81] -4.50 [-11.93, 2.94] -2.31 [-8.75, 4.12]
No. of respondents 972 427 545
No. of observations 23328 10248 13080
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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4.4. Welfare Analysis
In order to estimate the average respondent’s compensating variation (CV) for different
curtailment contract options in relation to the ‘status quo’ baseline contract, the welfare loss
or gain to the respondent is calculated (Hanemann, 1991; Birol et al., 2006). Table 6 presents
the CV estimates for 96 different hypothetical contract types. The standard errors for each
welfare estimate were computed using the Delta method and the statistical significance level
is indicated by the stars on each estimate reported in Table 6. All 16 contract combinations
of appliance type, advance notice and opt out are examined across different frequencies of
curtailment (1 per month; 3 per month; 6 per month; 9 per month; 20 per month, and 30
per month). It is important to note that each of the welfare impacts are estimated relative
to the base contract of the ‘status quo’, the respondent’s current contract as it is today.
Not surprisingly, the CV estimates are largest for the electric oven at all frequencies of
curtailment. For the hypothetical contracts examined, the welfare loss associated with the
inclusion of the electric oven in the curtailment contract are estimated to range between
¿16.46 and ¿53.78 bimonthly with all losses found to be highly statistically significant. The
welfare loss is smallest where there are both advance notice and an opt out available, and
the frequency is only once per month, while the loss is largest where there are no advance
notice nor opt out available and the frequency is 30 per month. In relation to the frequency
of curtailment, when the frequency is increased for each of the 16 hypothetical contracts
in Table 6, the welfare impact also increases considerably and helps demonstrate the large
disutility found to be associated with a higher frequency of curtailment for each appliance.
For example, Contract 1 curtails the household washing machine and contains both advance
notice and an opt out. By moving from one curtailment event per month up to thirty
events per month, the bimonthly welfare loss for contract 1 in Table 6 is estimated to start
statistically indifferent to zero and then grow to a loss of ¿35.45 that is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Interestingly, contract 12 which curtails the tumble dryer once per month and includes
both advance notice and an opt out is predicted to provide a welfare gain of ¿10.51 for
the average respondent. This suggests that respondents might receive utility from having
their tumble dryers curtailed at low frequencies per month, particularly in the instances
where advance notice and an opt out are also available. Also, it is noteworthy that any
hypothetical contract which curtails the tumble dryer or dishwasher is not expected to incur
a significant welfare loss until at least after nine events per month and this could signal a
large potential for demand flexibility from such appliances. In contrast, the results show that
in certain cases, welfare losses from the curtailment of the washing machine could become
significant beyond just six events per month and thus, the presence of advance notice or an
opt out for this appliance in the contract may then play an ever more important role for a
consumer’s welfare at the margin.
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Table 6: Attribute levels and compensating variation estimates for hypothetical contracts relative to the base contract with no curtailment
Compensating Variation (¿ Bimonthly)
Advance By Frequency of Curtailment
Contract Appliance Notice Opt Out 1 per month 3 per month 6 per month 9 per month 20 per month 30 per month
1 Washing Machine 7 7 -5.53 -7.59** -10.69*** -13.78*** -25.13*** -35.45***
2 Electric Oven 7 7 -23.86*** -25.92*** -29.02*** -32.11*** -43.46*** -53.78***
3 Tumble Dryer 7 7 3.11 1.04 -2.05 -5.15 -16.50*** -26.82***
4 Dishwasher 7 7 -1.34 -3.40 -6.50* -9.59** -20.94*** -31.26***
5 Washing Machine 3 7 -1.75 -3.82 -6.91* -10.01*** -21.36*** -31.68***
6 Washing Machine 3 3 1.87 -0.19 -3.29 -6.38* -17.73*** -28.05***
7 Washing Machine 7 3 -1.90 -3.97 -7.06* -10.16*** -21.51*** -31.83***
8 Electric Oven 3 7 -20.09*** -22.15*** -25.25*** -28.34*** -39.69*** -50.01***
9 Electric Oven 3 3 -16.46*** -18.52*** -21.62*** -24.72*** -36.07*** -46.38***
10 Electric Oven 7 3 -20.23*** -22.30*** -25.39*** -28.49*** -39.84*** -50.16***
11 Tumble Dryer 3 7 6.88* 4.82 1.72 -1.37 -12.72*** -23.04***
12 Tumble Dryer 3 3 10.51*** 8.44** 5.35 2.25 -9.10* -19.42***
13 Tumble Dryer 7 3 6.73* 4.67 1.57 -1.52 -12.87** -23.19***
14 Dishwasher 3 7 2.44 0.37 -2.72 -5.82 -17.17*** -27.49***
15 Dishwasher 3 3 6.06* 4.00 0.90 -2.19 -13.54*** -23.86***
16 Dishwasher 7 3 2.29 0.22 -2.87 -5.97 -17.32*** -27.64***
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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5. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper employs a discrete choice experiment to reveal consumer preferences for elec-
tricity contracts with curtailment on household appliances during peak load hours. An
econometric analysis of the responses to the experiment is based on a statistically represen-
tative sample of 972 Irish electricity consumers. More specifically, the sample is split between
households that have all four appliances (washing machine, tumble dryer, dishwasher and
electric oven) and households that don’t have all four appliances. An analysis on the former
sub-sample facilitates a key assumption for a choice experiment that respondents are able to
make relative tradeoffs between all attributes across different alternatives. While an analysis
on the latter sub-sample is undertaken to provide an insight into consumer preferences in
households that don’t own all appliances and helps provide some evidence for the theoretical
validity of the methodology.
All the attributes examined in the choice experiment are found to be important factors for
consumer preferences for contracts including curtailment. Specifically, the results from all the
samples analysed show that, all other factors equal, consumers are on average indifferent to
their status quo electricity contract and this might suggest a strong potential for acceptance
of contracts including curtailment on household appliances. Nevertheless, there is a large
preference heterogeneity around the status quo contract given the large and statistically
significant standard deviation estimated in the study.
In terms of the attribute for electricity discount, the parameter estimate is found to be
consistent across the samples and models used in the analysis and this provides assurance
regarding the validity of the overall experiment. This parameter represents the marginal
utility of income and in line with economic theory is estimated to be positive and highly sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that consumers prefer higher discounts as one might expect.
Moreover, the frequency of curtailment events in these types of contracts is also revealed
to be a significant factor for consumer preferences with fewer events preferred to more. In
examining the coefficient estimates on the attributes for advance notice and opt out across
samples, the results show that these are also very important features for consumers’ choice
of curtailment contract. On average, consumers are found to have stronger preferences for
contracts that contained both an advance notice of at least 12 hours for an upcoming event
and an opt out from one event per month to be used when necessary. While the findings
demonstrate that consumers prefer contracts at low frequencies with advance warning and
an opt out, their preferences are shown to be largely dominated by the type of appliance in
the end-use specific curtailable contract.
Concerning the household appliances attribute, the results show that during peak load
hours between 5pm and 8pm, consumers are less likely to choose a contract that curtails
the electric oven when compared to the washing machine. On the other hand, the findings
from the full sample suggest that consumers are on average indifferent to curtailing their
tumble dryer or dishwasher relative to their washing machines. It is important to note that
household ownership of the separate appliances is an important factor for any preference
heterogeneity for the appliance attribute in the choice experiment. In this regard, the full
sample is divided between respondents that have all four appliances and respondents that
don’t. The estimated parameters for the sample of respondents that own all four appliances
25
suggest that consumers prefer contracts that curtail either the tumble dryer or dishwasher.
Whereas, the respondents that don’t own all appliances are found to be less likely to choose
contracts that curtail the tumble dryer or dishwasher. Since these respondents are also
much less likely to own these appliances, this provides evidence for the validity of the choice
experiment with respondents observed to be acting rationally by choosing contracts that
curtail appliances that they actually own. More generally, the tumble dryer was the most
preferred appliance in these types of end-use specific curtailable contracts.
Furthermore, this paper indirectly infers monetary values for the trade-offs made be-
tween different attributes in the form of marginal willingness to accept (WTA) estimates.
Not surprisingly, with most disutility placed on having the electric oven curtailed, the WTA
estimates are highest for this particular attribute and the results show that consumers re-
quire compensations of between ¿14.32 and ¿23.16 extra per bi-monthly bill relative to the
curtailment of the washing machine. On the contrary, consumers are found to be much more
flexible with their tumble dryers or dishwashers. For example, using the sample of consumers
that owned all four appliances, respondents are willing to accept less bimonthly compensa-
tion on average for a contract that curtailed their tumble dryer (¿8.64 less) or dishwasher
(¿4.19 less) relative to curtailing their washing machine. Moreover, consumers are found to
require a discount of between 34 cents and 78 cents per curtailment event and are willing
to pay ¿4.50 towards their bi-monthly bill for advance notice and ¿3.68 for an opt-out on
average.
Related to the WTA estimates, this paper also conducts a welfare analysis where the
average respondent’s compensating variation (CV) is calculated across 96 different curtail-
ment contract options. It is important to note that the welfare analysis here explores welfare
from the consumer’s standpoint only. Despite this, it is also likely that there are welfare
effects from deploying curtailable contracts at the energy systems level, for example from
the requirement for less peaking capacity, and future research could address this issue. At
an overall level, the bimonthly welfare loss from including the electric oven in the contract
is substantial and ranges between ¿16.46 and ¿53.78 dependent on the frequency of cur-
tailment events. Apart from the electric oven, contracts that curtailed the other appliances
at low frequencies are found to have either a welfare loss that was statistically indifferent
to zero or a small welfare gain. On the other hand, at higher event frequencies, the mean
welfare loss grew to a statistically significant loss of between ¿26.82 and ¿35.45 dependent
on the appliance. Interestingly, contracts that curtail the tumble dryer at low frequencies
are estimated to provide consumers with a moderate welfare gain. This would suggest that
there is considerable utility associated with the occasional curtailment of the tumble dryer on
average and thus, compensation might not be needed for the deployment of rare curtailment
on this appliance type to the benefit of energy system operators. In addition, it is also worth
highlighting that welfare losses are found to be at their smallest across household appliances
when the contract includes both advance notice and an opt out.
There are a number of limitations associated with this analysis. One concern for stated
preference methodologies is so-called ‘hypothetical bias’, whereby respondents’ stated val-
ues could be different from their real values and thus, any welfare measures based on their
stated values could be overestimated as a result of such bias. With this in mind, the choice
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experiment is designed using a multinomial incentive-compatible response format, where
respondents are presented with their status quo electricity contract as well as the two alter-
native curtailable contracts to be evaluated in each choice card. This should help to satisfy
the incentive compatibility requirements for truthful preference revelation.
Another concern related to this analysis is the survey mode used to elicit consumer pref-
erences for electricity contracts with curtailment on household appliances. Online surveys
can sometimes be less representative as a result of improper population coverage. They may
also lead to poorer data quality due to the risk that some respondents might not fully under-
stand the experiment and cannot seek clarification from a trained interviewer. To mitigate
against these factors, this study adopts a number of different approaches. Firstly, a stratified
random sample was selected from a reputable panel provider using a sampling frame from
the most recent Irish Census (2016) which was based on geographic location, gender, age and
employment status. This helps to ensure that the sample is representative of the population
of Irish people aged 18 and over. Secondly, the survey includes two screening questions to
ensure data quality by determining that the online respondents were paying adequate atten-
tion. The observations from respondents failing the screening questions together with the
observations from respondents in the top and bottom 5% of survey completion times are
removed from the analysis to help maintain good data quality. Thirdly, to assist with any
complexity in understanding the experiment, the survey also includes a short and engaging
animated video describing curtailment contracts in plain language as well as explaining what
was required of respondents to complete the task.
In terms of the policy and market implications of this study, the results suggest that
there is a large potential for end-use specific curtailable contracts. Consumers are gener-
ally found to prefer the alternative curtailable contracts presented to them, whilst being
indifferent to their current electricity contracts. This could present policymakers and grid
operators with much greater flexibility in balancing electricity systems that have larger shares
of intermittent renewable generation and help achieve greenhouse gas emissions targets more
effectively. Moreover, the monetary compensations required by consumers to accept these
types of end-use specific curtailable contracts are much lower and more realistic compared
to compensations estimated in other studies that aim to elicit compensations for direct load
control and soft load control, for example in Broberg and Persson (2016) and Broberg et al.
(2017) respectively. This might suggest that this type of demand side flexibility could be
more favourable to both consumer welfare and the electricity market more generally.
In addition, this analysis helps policymakers and utilities to understand the value that
different electricity services provide to consumers by presenting them with meaningful esti-
mates of the flexibility of so-called ‘smart appliances’. For example, it is apparent in this
study that consumers are very flexible with their tumble dryers and dishwashers during peak
evening hours, while they are more resolute with respect to their electric ovens. Indeed, the
results indicate that for curtailable contracts on the tumble dryer or dishwasher, there is no
significant welfare loss to consumers until at least after nine curtailment events per month.
Also of relevance to the acceptance of curtailable contracts is the availability of user
friendly controls such as the provision of advance notice or an opt out. The presence of these
type of controls are found to be very important to consumer welfare at the margin and as
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a result, such features should be given consideration by those utilities and grid operators
interested in pursuing this type of demand flexibility. A further consideration for policy
and the market is the large preference heterogeneity for the individual attributes in the
experiment. All the estimated standard deviations of the random parameters are found to
be statistically significant across the attributes and it would be important for future research
to explore the different factors that might help to explain this heterogeneity.
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Appendix A
Screening Questions
Question 1
Question: This question is only about the data quality. Please select B as your answer
choice.
Answer Options: 1: A, 2: B, 3: C, 4: D
Question 2
Question: How much do you agree with the following statement:
Statement: It’s important that you pay attention to this study, please tick ”Strongly
disagree”.
Answer Options: 1: Strongly agree, 2: Agree, 3: Neither agree or disagree, 4: Disagree,
5: Strongly disagree
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